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COMPARABLE WORTH - A NECESSARY
VEHICLE FOR PAY EQUITY
INTRODUCTION
As the middle part of this decade has arrived, the concept
of comparable worth, which many describe as the issue of
the 1980s, I is still alive and the subject of much heated and
unresolved debate.2 A comparable worth theory essentially
holds that men, women, and minorities should be paid
equally for jobs that are of comparable value to the em-
ployer.3 A comparable worth claim is based on evidence
that workers in "female" jobs earn less than workers in
"male" jobs that require comparable skill, effort, and re-
sponsibility.4 Since the 1980 United States Supreme Court
decision which opened the door for potential comparable
worth claims,5 a mass of articles, commentaries, and books
have been written espousing numerous authors' views on the
subject.6 More significant to the fate of comparable worth's
existence has been the subsequent decision of a federal dis-
1. See, e.g., A. GOLD, A DIALOGUE ON COMPARABLE WORTH 1 (1983). See also
The Christian Science Monitor, Jan. 19, 1984, at 17, col. 1.
2. See generally A. GOLD, supra note 1; COMPARABLE WORTH: ISSUES AND AL-
TERNATIVES (E. Livernash ed. 1980); Blumrosen, Wage Discrimination and Job Segre-
gation: The Survival of a Theory, 14 U. MICH. J.L. REF. 1 (1980) [hereinafter cited as
Blumrosen II]; Blumrosen, Wage Discrimination, Job Segregation and Title VII ofthe
Civil Rights Act of 1964, 12 U. MICH. J.L. REF. 399 (1979) [hereinafter cited as Blum-
rosen I]; Gasaway, Comparable Worth: A Post-Gunther Overview, 69 GEO. L.J. 1123
(1981); Nelson, Opton & Wilson, Wage Discrimination and the "Comparable Worth"
Theory in Perspective, 13 U. MICH. L.J. REF. 233 (1980) [hereinafter cited as Nelson];
Comment, Sex-Based Wage Discrimination Claims After County of Washington v.
Gunther, 81 COLUM. L. REV. 1333 (1981) [hereinafter cited as Claims After Gunthel;
Comment, Equal Pay For Comparable Work, 15 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 475 (1980)
[hereinafter cited as Equal PaA; Comment, Comparable Worth Theory of Title VII
Sex Discrimination in Compensation, 47 Mo. L. REV. 495 (1982)[hereinafter cited as
Comparable Worth Theory]; Comment, Comparable Worth, 16 U.S.F.L. REV. 357
(1982) [hereinafter cited as Comparable Worth].
3. Spaulding v. University of Washington, 35 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. (BNA) 217,
230 n. 10 (9th Cir. 1984) (quoting B. SCHLEI & P. GROSSMAN, EMPLOYMENT DISCRIM-
INATION LAW 475 (2d ed. 1983)).
4. Note, Sex-Based Wage Discrimination Under the Title VII Disparate Impact
Doctrine, 34 STAN. L. REV. 1083, 1084 n.11 (1982).
5. County of Washington v. Gunther, 452 U.S. 161 (1981).
6. See supra note 2.
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trict court which sanctioned the theory's use in a wage dis-
crimination action.7
Part I of this Comment reviews the statistics and studies
which document the pervasive discrimination experienced
by women. It considers key federal legislation aimed at
eliminating the discrimination, and the various interpreta-
tions of that legislation. Part II examines the threshold cases
which have advanced or restricted the evolution of the com-
parable worth theory. Part III sets forth various types of
comparable worth theories concentrating on that theory
which relies heavily on the use of job evaluations. It demon-
strates the different approaches plaintiffs can take with these
evaluations. Part IV argues that job evaluations are essential
in establishing a comparable worth claim. It establishes that
despite their inherent subjectivity, job evaluations are the
most reliable indicator of a job's true value. Part IV demon-
strates that the force of the marketplace neither should be
incorporated into the study nor used by employers as a de-
fense to a comparable worth action. This part further argues
that, if anything, the subjectivity of job evaluations works
against women. Part V contends that the potential cost re-
sulting from a successful comparable worth action is no de-
fense for employers. Furthermore, it maintains that the
consequences need not be as drastic as often imagined. Var-
ious alternatives exist which can pave a smoother path on
the road toward employment equality for women.
I. WAGE DISCRIMINATION AND REMEDIAL STATUTES
A. Wage Discrimination Against Women
It is well-established that women in the United States
earn far less than men. The average white female worker
can expect to earn fifty-six percent of her male counterpart's
wage. This is disheartening for those who believe that time
will eventually reduce the wage gap, as eighteen years earlier
women earned sixty-five percent of what men did.9 An ar-
gument which tends to ameliorate the impact of these statis-
7. AFSCME v. State of Washington, 578 F. Supp. 846 (W.D. Wash. 1983).
8. See A. GOLD, supra note I, at 3 (citing Bureau of the Census, U.S. Dep't of
Commerce).
9. WOMEN, WORK, AND WAGES: EQUAL PAY FOR JOBS OF EQUAL VALUE 16 (D.
Treiman and H. Hartman eds. 1981).
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tics is that these studies do not take into account the
differences in labor-market experiences between the sexes.' 0
That is, men have the propensity to permanently remain in
the labor force, accumulate more market skills and informa-
tion than women, and thus, receive a higher wage." Yet,
empirical studies have shown that these legally neutral fac-
tors explain only forty-two to sixty-seven percent of the pay
disparity between men and women. 12
These statistics are not surprising as working women
generally receive less income than men with comparable ed-
ucation and work experience. 13 Furthermore, the dramatic
influx of women entering the marketplace 14 brings with it a
significant proportion of women in lower paying entry
jobs.'5
Not only do many women enter the labor market to take
lower paying jobs, but the type of work they perform is very
often work traditionally done by women. 16 This is not to say
that women have not increased their numbers in tradition-
ally male-dominated occupations such as law, management-
administration, and medicine. 17 That women are making
great strides in many professional fields is encouraging.
However, most of the forty million working women still re-
main in jobs traditionally reserved for women. Women tend
to become nurses, librarians, school teachers, and bank tell-
10. COMPARABLE WORTH - A SYMPOSIUM ON THE ISSUES AND ALTERNATIVES 15
(1981) [hereinafter cited as Symposium].
11. Id. at 16.
12. See Note, Equal Pay, Comparable Work, and Job Evaluation 90 YALE L.J.
657, 660 & n.21 (1981).
13. See BUREAU OF THE CENSUS, U.S. DEP'T OF COMMERCE, STATISTICAL AB-
STRACT OF THE UNITED STATES No. 752, at 464 (1978) [hereinafter cited as STATISTI-
CAL ABSTRACT] (showing that in 1977, a full-time male worker who completed one to
three years of high school received a median income of $13,120, while a female col-
lege graduate was paid a median income for full-time work of $12,656).
14. See Gasaway, supra note 2, at 1125 n.19 (citing Bureau of Labor Statistics,
U.S. Dep't of Labor, which disclosed that the proportion of women to total labor
force increased from eighteen percent in 1900 to fifty percent in 1978).
15. A. GOLD, supra note I, at 6.
16. Job segregation by sex is not a recent phenomenon. Looking back in United
States history, one will find that the New England textile mills employed young wo-
men in segregated jobs. See Blumrosen I, supra note 2, at 402.
17. Milwaukee Sentinel, Feb. 29, 1984, at 6, cols. 1-2 (citing Bureau of Labor
Statistics, U.S. Dep't of Labor, for years 1972-1982).
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ers. 18 This job segregation is highlighted in a 1984 study
which shows that eighty percent of women working outside
the home work in jobs where at least seventy percent of the
workers are female.' 9 Job segregation by sex would not de-
serve harsh criticism were it not for the fact that wages in
female-dominated jobs are almost always lower than wages
in male-dominated jobs.2 0 This fact explains why the major
cause of the wage gap between men and women is the differ-
ences in their occupational distribution.2 ' Frequently, this
pay disparity exists in different but comparable jobs. 22 This
wage discrimination clearly inflicts unfair financial hard-
ships on women.23
Socialization of both men and women also perpetuates
gender-based wage discrimination. Society continues to
place the primary parenting responsibility on women.24
Hence, many women are socialized to forego training or pro-
motions which would increase their earnings,2 5 as there are
children at home who need to be tended to. The structure of
the labor market hinders many women's full and equal
18. Id Few women have crossed over to male-dominated jobs, and few men have
entered jobs historically held by women. Id. at col. 2. It is interesting to note that
"bank-teller" is now designated a traditional women's job. Before World War II, it
was a highly prestigious position and almost exclusively held by males. As more wo-
men and minorities have become tellers, a teller's status has dropped along with op-
portunities for promotion to a loan officer. Blumrosen I, supra note 2, at 408.
19. See Pay Equity and Comparable Worth, Special Report (BNA) 5 (1984).
20. See A. GOLD, supra note 1, at 7. A 1970 census revealed that each additional
percentage point of women in any given occupation resulted in a median compensa-
tion drop of forty-two dollars a year for that occupation. Id.
21. See studies published in Fuchs, Differences in Hourly Earnings Between Men
and Women, 94 MONTHLY LAB. REV., May, 1971, at 9, 14.
22. See Note, supra note 12, at 662 (explaining how wages are determined when
jobs are segregated).
23. See Blumrosen I, supra note 2, at 404. Between 1962 and 1972, the number of
households headed by women increased by forty-six percent. People in those house-
holds were three times as likely to be in poverty than others. Id See also Pay Equity
and Comparable Worth, supra note 19, at 70, which states that one out of six women is
the head of a household.
24. Frug, Securing Job Equality for Women: Labor Market Hostility to Working
Mothers, 59 B.U.L. REv. 55, 57 (1979).
25. See Comment, Equal Payfor Comparable Work, supra note 2, at 477 (1980).
[Vol. 68:93
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achievement in the work force as it is too inflexible for indi-
viduals with major child care responsibilities.2 6
Thus, discrimination - be it subtle, blatant, innocent, or
intentional - does exist. The belief that "men are the
breadwinners and thus deserve more" is, unfortunately, still
with us. 27 Furthermore, many jobs are stereotyped as "wo-
men's work." Almost always, this label brings with it wages
far below those received for comparable men's work.2 8 Al-
though admittedly not equal work, the job requirements of a
"household worker" and a "janitor" are somewhat similar as
far as skill, effort, stress, and responsibility. However, the
former category (95 percent female) receives $5,600 a year,
while the latter category (85 percent male) earns $11,400.29
Any differences between the two jobs surely do not warrant
an approximate 100 percent disparity in the pay scale. The
structure for compensation for these jobs was established at
a time when employers could intentionally pay different
wages to men and women for the same job.30 Because of the
commonly held notion that women worked only for "pin
money,"3' employers felt that women did not need to earn
the same wage as men. It is difficult to imagine that this
belief was instantaneously discarded the moment the wage
discrimination statutes were enacted. Accordingly, employ-
ers had no reason to increase low wages in predominantly
women-held jobs if the equal employment statutes did not
mandate the action. Hence, women's wages still remain sig-
nificantly depressed.
26. See Frug, supra note 24. "The labor force is organized as if workers do not
have family responsibilities. The traditional work schedule is too inflexible and too
long for a parent with primary child care responsibility." Id at 56.
27. See Symposium, supra note 10, at 59. See also Lanegan-Grimm v. Library
Ass'n, 560 F. Supp, 486 (D. Ore. 1983) (intentional sex discrimination found where a
supervisor told a female bookmobile driver that a male truck driver was paid more
because he was a man and the head of a household).
28. See Comment, Equal Pay, supra note 2, at 478, in which the author posited
that the position of women's "jobs in the hierarchy of wages among occupations [was]
established at a time when employers could lawfully base pay differentials upon sex
even for men and women in the same job."
29. The Christian Science Monitor, Jan. 19, 1984, at 17, col. I (citing Bureau of
Labor Statistics, March, 1982).
30. Before the Equal Pay Act and Title VII, there was nothing that forced em-
ployers to pay women and minorities the same wage as was paid to white males.
31. See Blumrosen I, supra note 2, at 421.
1984]
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B. Equal Pay Act, Title VII, and the Bennett Amendment
The Equal Pay Act of 196332 forbids discriminatory com-
pensation between employees of different gender who per-
form work of "equal skill, effort, and responsibility. '33
Unequal pay for equal work is permitted if the employer can
establish that the unequal pay is the result of one of the Act's
four defenses - (1) a seniority system; (2) a merit system; (3)
a system measuring earnings by quantity or quality of pro-
duction; or (4) a differential based on any factor other than
sex.
34
While the statute does not expressly state that it does not
encompass equal pay for comparable work claims, both its
legislative history35 and subsequent interpretations36 seem to
foreclose the idea. Despite this interpretation, the Equal Pay
Act was and continues to be an extremely vital and neces-
sary vehicle by which women have successfully challenged
discriminatory pay wages. Though this legislation is to be
32. 29 U.S.C. § 206(d)(1) (1982).
33. Id. The Act reads in part:
No employer. . . shall discriminate. . . on the basis of sex by paying wages
to employees. . . at a rate less than the rate at which he [or she] pays wages to
employees of the opposite sex. . . for equal work on jobs the performance of
which requires equal skill, effort, and responsibility, and which are performed
under similar working conditions, except where such payment is made pursu-
ant to (i) a seniority system; (ii) a merit system; (iii) a system which measures
earnings by quantity or quality of production; or (iv) a differential based on
any other factor than sex ....
Id
34. Id It should be noted that the Equal Pay Act was enacted as an amendment
to the Fair Labor Standards Act (FLSA), Pub. L. No. 75-718, 52 Stat. 1060 (1938)
(codified at 29 U.S.C. §§ 201-19 (1982)). Thus, it is subject to the FLSA's limitations
and does not apply to certain employers engaged in fishing, agriculture, retail sales,
and newspaper publishing. See, e.g., 29 U.S.C. § 213(a) (1982).
35. Legislative history reveals that Congress considered the word "comparable"
instead of "equal." In 1962, the word "comparable" was replaced by the word
"equal" in H.R. 11677, 87th Cong., 2d Sess. (1962), by a floor amendment. See 108
Cong. Rec. 14771 (1962). In a 1963 House debate, Representative Goodell stated that
by using the word "equal," the jobs effected "should be virtually identical, that is,
they would be very much alike or closely related to each other." 109 Cong. Rec. 9197
(1963).
36. See County of Washington v. Gunther, 452 U.S. 161 (1981); Brennan v. City
Stores, Inc., 479 F.2d 235 (5th Cir. 1973); Schultz v. Wheaton Glass Co., 421 F.2d 259
(3d Cir.), cert. denied, 398 U.S. 905 (1970). The court stated in Brennan that "the
standard of equality is clearly higher than mere comparability yet lower than absolute
identity ...." 479 F.2d at 238 (emphasis added).
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applauded, it alone is not broad enough to ameliorate the
tremendous wage disparity between the sexes. Furthermore,
employers can subtly violate the Equal Pay Act by assigning
different job titles to predominantly female jobs and
predominantly male jobs, and paying the men more than the
women, despite the jobs' virtual identity. For example, in
Wisconsin, the American Federation of State, County and
Municipal Employes (AFSCME) has filed charges with the
Equal Employment Opportunity Commission, alleging that
bakers, who are almost all men, earn $1800 a year more than
cooks, who are almost all women. Simultaneously, it asserts
that predominantly male upholsterers earn $2300 more than
predominantly female seamstresses.37
Another statute which effectively addresses sex discrimi-
nation is Title VII.3 8 It also expressly forbids a wide variety
of gender-based discriminatory employment practices. Its
purview is far more extensive than that of the Equal Pay Act
as Title VII forbids employment discrimination on the basis
of race, color, religion, sex, or national origin. 39  Shortly
before Title VII became law, the Bennett Amendment 4° was
added to it. As the Equal Pay Act had already focused on
various methods of sex-based wage discrimination, this
Amendment was proposed as a means to harmonize the two
statutes. In the event of conffict between the two statutes,
the Bennett Amendment directed that the provisions of the
Equal Pay Act would not be nullified.41 The Amendment
37. Telephone interview with Diane Rock, Director of the Women's Rights Pro-
gram of the International AFSCME (Sept. 7, 1984). See also Milwaukee J., Dec. 25,
1983, at 2, cols. 2-3.
38. 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e to 2000e-17 (1982).
39. Title VII provides in part:
It shall be an unlawful employment practice for an employer - (1) to fail
or refuse to hire or to discharge any individual, or otherwise to discriminate
against any individual with respect to his [or her] compensation, terms, condi-
tions, or privileges of employment, because of such individual's race, color,
religion, sex, or national origin; or (2) to limit, segregate, or classify his [or her]
employees or applicants for employment in any way which would deprive or
tend to deprive any individual of employment opportunities or otherwise ad-
versely affect his [or her] status as an employee, because of such individual's
race, color, religion, sex, or national origin.
Id. § 2000e-2(a) (1982).
40. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(h) (1982).
41. See 110 Cong. Rec. 13,647 (1964).
1984]
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states that "[i]t shall not be an unlawful employment prac-
tice to differentiate on the basis of sex in determining the
amount of the wages or compensation paid or to be paid to
employees of such employer if such differentiation is author-
ized by the provisions of [the Equal Pay Act]." 42
In addition to creating a link between the Equal Pay Act
and Title VII, the Bennett Amendment has also been the
source of much controversy and heated debate.43 Its lan-
guage "if such differentiation is authorized by the Equal Pay
Act" 44 lends itself to two different interpretations.45 How
that language is construed determines the scope of Title
VII's breadth as it applies to sex-based wage discrimination.
What seems to be a minor analytical difference produces
drastically different results. Those opposed to the compara-
ble worth theory would urge a broad construction of the
Amendment. This construction would mean that all pay dif-
ferentials not addressed by the Equal Pay Act are, in effect,
not prohibited. As the Equal Pay Act does not address equal
pay for comparable work, it would logically follow that une-
qual pay for comparable work is permitted. If the Bennett
Amendment limits Title VII to the confines of the Equal Pay
Act, any claim that does not allege "equal pay for equal or
substantially equal work"46 has no merit under Title VII.
On the other hand, proponents of comparable worth con-
tend that the only pay differentiations authorized by the
Equal Pay Act are those justified by the four defenses avail-
able to employers - merit, seniority, productivity, or any
factor other than sex.47 This narrow construction of the Ben-
nett Amendment mandates that the only situations that Title
VII cannot address are those where the wage disparities are
due to these four exceptions. Hence, there would be nothing
42. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(h) (1982).
43. See supra note 2 for commentary on the topic.
44. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(h) (1982).
45. See infra notes 46-61 and accompanying text.
46. See Schultz v. Wheaton Glass Co., 421 F.2d 259, 265 (3d Cir.), cert. denied,
398 U.S. 905 (1970). Many courts utilize the Schultz court's "substantially equal"
language. But see Hodgson v. Golden Isles Convalescent Homes, Inc., 468 F.2d 1256,
1258 (5th Cir. 1972) (Congress substituted "equal work" for "comparable work" and
intended a "substantial identity ofjob functions," and hence, equal work not found).
47. 29 U.S.C. § 206(d)(1) (1982).
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to preclude a Title VII comparable worth action since it does
not fall within the four exceptions.
Various courts have also interpreted the Bennett Amend-
ment in these two alternative fashions. The former construc-
tion was adopted in Lemons v. City of Denver.48 There, the
Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit broadly construed
the Amendment and held that a Title VII claim does not
require an employer to compare unequal work for the pur-
pose of setting wages. 49 Thus, city nurses who wanted their
wages compared with wages in non-nursing positions had no
cause of action under Title VII because the Equal Pay Act
required equal work.5 0 The Tenth Circuit is not alone in its
method of construing the Bennett Amendment. Several
other courts have ruled that if a claim does not violate the
Equal Pay Act, it cannot be brought under Title VII.5 1
II. THE LEADING CASES
A. County of Washington v. Gunther
However, other courts,5 2 most significantly the United
States Supreme Court,53 have adopted a narrow construction
of the Amendment. This construction has opened the door
for potential comparable worth claims since unequal pay for
comparable work is not one of the defenses authorized by
the Equal Pay Act.54
48. 620 F.2d 228 (10th Cir.), cert. denied, 449 U.S. 888 (1980).
49. See id. at 229-30.
50. The city determined the nurses' compensation by comparing their wages with
those of other nurses in the community. The nurses asserted that all nurses have
historically been underpaid because their work has never been properly recognized
and because the profession has traditionally been dominated by women. Therefore,
the nurses argued that the city should not mirror the unfair condition and should
instead compare their positions with non-nursing positions. The court held, however,
that Title VII does not mandate comparing two different occupations. Id.
51. See, e.g., Di Salvo v. Chamber of Commerce, 568 F.2d 593 (8th Cir. 1978);
Christensen v. Iowa, 563 F.2d 353 (8th Cir. 1977) (Miller, J., concurring); Orr v.
Frank R. MacNeill & Son, Inc., 511 F.2d 166 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 423 U.S. 865
(1975).
52. See, e.g., International Union of Electrical, Radio and Machine Workers v.
Westinghouse Elec. Corp., 631 F.2d 1094 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 449 U.S. 1009 (1980);
Fitzgerald v. Sirloin Stockade, Inc., 624 F.2d 945 (10th Cir. 1980).
53. County of Washington v. Gunther, 452 U.S. 161 (1981).
54. This appears to be the more logical interpretation of the Bennett Amend-
ment. The term "authorized" connotes an affirmative giving of a legal right. That is,
1984]
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In County of Washington v. Gunther55 female jail guards
challenged a county pay scheme which paid them only sev-
enty percent of what the male guards received. 56 This dis-
parity existed even though the county's job evaluation
survey determined that the women's positions were worth
ninety-five percent of those of the male guards .5  The wo-
men argued that the county violated the Equal Pay Act as
their work was substantially equal to that of the male
guards. In the alternative, they alleged a violation of Title
VII because the pay differential was, in part, due to inten-
tional sex discrimination.58 The county maintained that Ti-
tle VII was not applicable as the women's work was not
substantially equal to that of the men. The United States
Supreme Court affirmed the Ninth Circuit's holding that the
Bennett Amendment was created solely to include the Equal
Pay Act's affirmative defenses in Title VII.59 Therefore, the
Court maintained that a pay disparity claim could be
brought under Title VII even if the person of the opposite
sex does not hold an equal but higher paying job, as long as
the challenged pay is not justified by one of the Equal Pay
Act's affirmative defenses. 60
the Amendment gives official approval and empowers employers to assert only the
defenses explicitly set forth and authorized by the Equal Pay Act. Had the propo-
nents of the amendment wished to confer greater latitude to defendants in a Title VII
gender-based discrimination suit, it seems a word such as "permitted" would have
been substituted for "authorized." The word "permitted" implies that defendants can
use the four defenses of the Equal Pay Act, but they are not estopped to assert other
defenses not set forth in the EPA.
55. 452 U.S. 161 (1981).
56. Id. at 180.
57. Id.
58. Id. at 164.
59. See id. at 168. See also International Union of Electrical, Radio & Machine
Workers v. Westinghouse Elec. Corp., 631 F.2d 1094, 1101 (3d Cir. 1980), in which
the court also stated that the plain language of Title VII suggested that the four excep-
tions of the Equal Pay Act were the only affirmative defenses available in a Title VII
case. The International Union court held, therefore, that sex-based wage discrimina-
tion is illegal even if the jobs compared are completely different. See id. at 1097.
60. 452 U.S. at 168. The Court stated that if the county's interpretation of the
Bennett Amendment were adopted, "discriminatory compensation by employers not
covered by the Fair Labor Standards Act [would be] 'authorized' - since not prohib-
ited - by the Equal Pay Act. Thus, it would deny Title VII protection against sex-
based wage discrimination by those employers not subject to the Fair Labor Stan-
dards Act but covered by Title VII." Id. at 179.
[Vol. 68:93
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The obvious consequence of this ruling was that Title
VII plaintiffs no longer had to prove that their work was
equal or substantially equal in skill, effort, and responsibility
to that of members of the opposite sex. The equal work lan-
guage of the Equal Pay Act would no longer bar a compara-
ble worth claim.61 Although the Court was quick to assert at
the outset that the plaintiffs' "claim is not based on the con-
troversial concept of 'comparable worth,' "62 the decision's
impact cannot be denied.
As would be expected, the Gunther decision prompted
scores of advocates and critics of the decision to respectively
praise and denounce the ruling. Proponents of comparable
worth lauded the fact that the Gunther decision eliminated
the major statutory obstacle to sex-based wage discrimina-
tion claims that do not allege equal work.63 They perceived
the ruling as a significant step forward, as unequal pay for
equal work is but a very small slice of the sex-discrimination
pie.64 A comparable worth claim would finally now be plau-
sible. However, opponents of the decision decried any sug-
gestion that the Gunther ruling removed all barriers to a
comparable worth claim. Rather, they have focused their
criticism on the implausibility, impracticability, and danger
of implementing a comparable worth system.65  Though
commentaries, books, and articles were written, no federal
court or federal legislation dealt with the issue until the end
of 1983.66
61. See id at 181. The Court defined comparable worth as a concept by which
"plaintiffs might claim increased compensation on the basis of a comparison of the
intrinsic worth or difficulty of their job with that of other jobs in the same organiza-
tion or community." Id. at 166.
62. Id. at 166.
63. See, e.g., Comment, Claims After Gunther, supra note 2, at 1347.
64. See Kahne & Kohen, Economic Perspectives on the Roles of Women in the
American Economy, 13 J. ECON. LIT. 1249, 1261 (1975), in which the authors stated
that "the sole consistent result of the melange of empirical studies surveyed is that sex
discrimination in the form of unequal pay for equal work is of little, if any, quantita-
tive significance."
65. See infra notes 152-200 and accompanying text.
66. It should be noted that at least one state court has upheld a comparable worth
claim under a state comparable worth statute. See Pennsylvania Human Relations
Comm'n v. Hempfield Township, 23 Pa. Commw. 351, 352 A.2d 218 (1976) (affirming
State Human Relations Commission's findings that the township violated the statute




B. AFSCME v. State of Washington
Once Gunther was decided, several federal courts of ap-
peal, when presented with a Title VII discrimination claim
not within the ambit of the Equal Pay Act, ruled in favor of
the plaintiffs. 67  The first federal court opinion which actu-
ally addressed the issue and granted a comparable worth
victory to the plaintiffs was AFSCME v. State of Washing-
ton.68 The plaintiffs were State of Washington employees in
job positions which were seventy percent or more female.
The defendant was the State of Washington.69
Prompted by reports that they "perpetuated the discrimi-
nation against women in salary setting," 70 the state's two
civil service systems conducted a study of the salary sched-
ules. The study's results revealed pay differences "not due
solely to the 'job' worth. '71 On the heels of the study, the
Governor hired an independent consulting firm. It was to
conduct an outside comprehensive study of the government
salaries to investigate the discriminatory pay scale reports.
The inquiry focused on job contents of 121 classifications.
All classifications were either predominantly male or fe-
67. See, e.g., Gerdom v. Continental Airlines, Inc., 692 F.2d 602 (9th Cir. 1982),
cert. denied, 103 S. Ct. 1534 (1983). "Flight hostesses," who occupied a position held
only by women, brought a Title VII sex discrimination claim against their employer.
The women asserted that the airline's weight requirement for the hostesses was dis-
criminatory as there was no similar requirement for directors of passenger services, an
all-male position. Id. at 603-04. The court rejected the defendant's argument that
since no men were flight hostesses, it had "immunized itself against claims of discrim-
inatory treatment." Id. at 607-08. Relying on the Gunther decision, the court stated
that the "plaintiffs here need not prove that men exempt from these rules performed
the same service." Id. at 607. See also McKee v. McDonnell Douglas Technical
Servs. Co., 700 F.2d 260 (5th Cir. 1983) (though plaintiffs' wage discrimination claim
did not support a claim under the EPA, this deficiency did not bar a claim under Title
viI.).
68. 578 F. Supp. 846 (W.D. Wash. 1983).
69. Id at 859-60.
70. Id at 860. These reports probably stemmed from the fact that, as late as
1973, the defendant placed help-wanted ads in the female and male columns of the
newspapers in the state. This placement was done despite the fact that no evidence
was offered "that sex was a bonafide occupational qualification for the jobs advertised
... " It was also done regardless of the fact that in 1971 the Governor of Washing-
ton signed into law an amendment prohibiting sex discrimination. The court record
was replete with information evincing state knowledge of the sex discrimination. Id.
71. Id at 860-61. The study indicated clear pay differences between job classifi-
cations predominantly held by women and those held by men. Id at 860.
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male.72 The 1974 report concluded that based on the mea-
sured job content of all classifications, women tended to be
paid twenty percent less than men for comparable work.73
In 1976, the defendant retained the same firm to update
the study and to establish a method to implement the com-
parable worth study completed in 1974. The study's meth-
odology attempted to value each job classification on the
basis of four criteria: knowledge and skills, mental de-
mands, accountability, and working conditions.74 Seven
years after the wage study, the State had not yet actually ap-
propriated funds to eliminate the salary dissimilarities.
The plaintiffs filed charges with the Equal Employment Op-
portunity Commission (EEOC), and when the Commission
took no action, the United States Department of Justice in-
formed the plaintiffs of their right to sue the State of Wash-
ington.76 The plaintiffs charged, under Title VII, that the
State discriminatorily paid lower salaries to individuals in
predominantly female job classifications than to individuals
in predominantly male job classifications that required equal
or less skill, effort, and responsibility.77
In its 1983 decision, the Western District Court of Wash-
ington focused on whether the plaintiffs' claim fell within
Title VII and, if it did, what burdens of proof the plaintiffs
and defendants had to carry to convince the trier of fact of
their positions. In doing so, the court set forth and relied on
case and statutory precedent. Asserting that Title VII pro-
hibits two types of employment discrimination - disparate
treatment and disparate impact - the court addressed both
to reach its decision.78
72. Id. at 852. "Predominantly" meant at least seventy percent of the same sex.
Id. at 861.
73. Id. The report also discovered that the degree of wage discrimination in-
creased as the job values did. Id.
74. Id. at 862.
75. I. at 863. In 1976, the Governor included seven million dollars in the state
budget to begin increasing many of the women's salaries. In 1977, the subsequent
Governor withdrew the appropriation from the budget. In 1980, the Governor told
the legislature that a further update of the study indicated increased inequality and
that the state could no longer perpetuate unfairness. Id at 862.
76. Id. at 860.
77. Id at 853.
78. See id at 856.
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The district court explained that disparate treatment is
intentional and unfavorable treatment of some employees
based on impermissible criteria.79 In setting forth the neces-
sary elements of a Title VII disparate treatment case, the
court used the allocation of burdens and order of presenta-
tion of proof formulated in Texas Department of Community
Affairs v. Burdine.80 The plaintiffs first must prove, by a pre-
ponderance of the evidence, a prima facie case of discrimi-
nation.8' If the plaintiff proves the prima facie case, the
burden of production shifts to the defendant "to articulate
some legitimate, nondiscriminatory reason" for the alleged
discriminatory treatment.8 2 If the defendant carries this bur-
den, the plaintiff has an opportunity "to prove by a prepon-
derance of the evidence that the legitimate reasons offered
by the defendant were not its true reasons, but were a pretext
for discrimination." 83
Disparate impact, on the other hand, usually involves
class actions rather than individual claims .8  This type of
claim alleges practices which are neutral on their face, but
have a discriminatory impact and are not justified by busi-
ness necessity. 5 The court stated that to establish a prima
facie case of disparate impact, plaintiffs must prove, by a
preponderance of the evidence, that the defendant's wage
compensation system has a significantly discriminatory im-
pact. That is, though the system appears facially neutral, its
79. See id. See also Teamster.€v. United States, 431 U.S. 324, 335 n.15 (1977)
(stating disparate treatment occurs where "[tlhe employer simply treats some people
less favorably than others because of their race, color, religion, sex or national origin.
Proof of discriminatory motive is critical, although it can in some situations be in-
ferred from the mere fact of differences in treatment.").
80. 450 U.S. 248 (1981).
81. AFSCME, 578 F. Supp. at 857.
82. Id.
83. Id. (citation omitted). See, e.g., Grove v. Frostburg Nat'l Bank, 549 F. Supp.
922 (D. Md. 1982) (employer found liable when explanations of wage difference
proved to be pretextual).
84. See Nelson, supra note 2, at 281 (disparate impact analysis evolved from large
scale class actions in which plaintiffs alleged that particular employment selection
criteria had a detrimental impact on a class of persons protected by Title VII).
85. AFSCME, 578 F. Supp. at 856. See Griggs v. Duke Power Co., 401 U.S. 424
(1971), which was the first case in which the Supreme Court articulated the "disparate
impact" doctrine. The Court ruled that an employment test, though neutral on its
face, disqualified a greater percentage of black job applicants than white job appli-
cants. The test was, therefore, violative of Title VII.
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impact is indeed discriminatory. Unlike disparate treat-
ment, the plaintiffs need not show discriminatory intent- 6
The second step is similar to that of a disparate treatment
claim, as the burden of production shifts to the defendant.
The court adopted specific language from a previous case
and stated that in employment compensation cases, the de-
fendant must "demonstrate that legitimate and overriding
business considerations provide justification. ' 87 The final
stage in a disparate impact case is identical to that of a dis-
parate treatment case whereby the plaintiff will prevail if the
"pretext" requirement is proved.88
Having examined the preceding claims and having laid
out methods to analyze them, the court set forth its threshold
question: Did the defendant's failure to pay the plaintiffs
that amount of money which the comparable worth studies
indicated was forthcoming constitute a violation of Title
VII?8 9
The district court explicitly acknowledged that the case
was one of "first impression" as it concerned the implemen-
tation of a comparable worth claim. 90 However, in the same
breath, the court stated that it was more accurately a "failure
to pay" case.9' Regardless of the "type" of case the court
deemed it to be, the judge found wage discrimination under
both the disparate treatment and disparate impact allega-
tions. The plaintiffs presented convincing evidence for their
disparate treatment allegation. The court held that the
"[d]efendant's implementation and perpetuation of the pres-
ent system of compensation is intentional and results in un-
86. 578 F. Supp. at 857 (citation omitted). A disparate impact claim can be estab-
lished by reviewing job applicants or employees affected. See Griggs v. Duke Power
Co., 401 U.S. 424,430 n.6 (1971) (tests used by Duke Power in screening its job appli-
cants resulted in a passing score for fifty-eight percent of the white applicants but only
six percent for the black applicants).
87. 578 F. Supp. at 857 (citing Bonilla v. Oakland Scavenger Co., 697 F.2d 1297,
1303 (9th Cir. 1982)).
88. 578 F. Supp. at 857. The court noted that plaintiffs may prove "pretext" with
"proof of past intentional discrimination, or proof that an alternative practice would
serve the Defendant's legitimate interests with less disparate impact." Id (citation
omitted).
89. Id. at 866.
90. Id at 865.
91. d This contention is obviously based on the fact that the study's results were
known in 1974 and that, as late as 1981, the state had failed to remedy the problem.
1984]
MARQJUETTE LAW REVIEW
favorable treatment of employees in predominantly female
job classifications,"92 in violation of Title VII. Because the
defendant failed to rebut the plaintiffs' showing of disparate
treatment with a legitimate, nondiscriminatory reason for
the pay system, the plaintiffs prevailed on this claim.93 The
court likewise handled the disparate impact claim quite eas-
ily. The defendant's system of compensation, while facially
neutral, had the disparate impact of paying a twenty percent
lower wage for predominantly female jobs than for predomi-
nantly male jobs.94 As with the disparate treatment charge,
the defendant's presentation of evidence fell short of rebut-
ting the plaintiffs' prima facie case.
Satisfying the requirements for their disparate treatment
and impact claims, the plaintiffs prevailed in their Title VII
discrimination case against the government. The court
stressed the importance of eradicating employment practices
violative of Title VII and, in doing so, looked to the earlier
case of Griggs v. Duke Power Co.95 Relying on language
from Griggs, the district court stated that the defendant's em-
ployment practices, though "'neutral on their face. . . can-
not be maintained if they operate to freeze the status quo of
prior discriminatory employment practices.' "96 The court
granted the plaintiffs' request for both a declaratory judg-
ment and injunctive relief to provide enforcement of a non-
discriminatory compensation system. It ordered that any job
classification which was seventy percent or more female was
entitled to the remedy of injunctive relief and backpay.97
In fashioning this remedy, the court asserted that the
main purpose of Title VII is "to achieve equality of employ-
ment opportunities and remove barriers that have operated
in the past to favor an identifiable group of. . .employees
over other employees. 9 8 Thus, the court posited that, at the
92. Id at 864.
93. Id. at 864-65. The court asserted that the defendant did not produce credible,
admissible evidence which would raise a genuine issue of fact as to whether it dis-
criminated against the plaintiff. Id at 865.
94. Id at 863.
95. 401 U.S. 424 (1971).
96. AFSCME, 578 F. Supp. at 866 (quoting Griggs, 401 U.S. at 430).
97. 578 F. Supp. at 871.
98. Id at 867 (citation omitted).
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very least, removal of the discriminatory barriers mandated
injunctive relief. In ordering the injunctive relief, the court
rejected the defendant's seven arguments99 for a contrary re-
sult. The fact that the court neither questioned the evalua-
tion's credibility nor seriously entertained the defendant's
"cost-justification"' 1 argument is important as the latter
part of this Comment will demonstrate.' 0'
Following plaintiffs' resounding victory in AFSCME, the
Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit came out with an
unfavorable decision for comparable worth plaintiffs. The
court in Spaulding v. University of Washington'0 2 ruled that
in a comparable worth claim proof of disparate impact is not
sufficient to establish a prima facie violation of Title VII.1°3
In its holding, the Spaulding court relied on and agreed with
the decisions in Lemons v. City of Denver' 4 and Christensen
v. Iowa10 5 These courts refused to accept a construction of
Title VII which would allow an establishment of a prima
facie violation of the Act "whenever employees of different
sexes receive disparate compensation for work of differing
skills, that may, subjectively, be of equal value to the em-
ployer, but does not command an equal price in the labor
market."' 6 In so holding, the court stated that comparable
worth plaintiffs need to prove "disparate treatment."'10 7
The Spaulding court asserted that the case did not actu-
99. Id at 867.
100. After the court maintained that Title VII did not contain a cost justification
defense, it stated that the cost, as disruptive as it may be, was a direct result of dis-
crimination created and maintained by the defendant. In a cause-effect relationship,
it said, "one cannot be heard to argue that the effect is the evil to be eradicated." Id
at 868. In response to the state's contention of its "lack of revenue," the court replied
that when the Governor withdrew the appropriation in the 1976-77 biennium, the
state had a surplus budget. Id. at 868.
101. See infra notes 193-203 and accompanying text.
102, 35 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. (BNA) 217 (9th Cir. 1984).
103. See id at 231. The Spaulding court stated that its decision was in accord
with Power v. Barry County, 539 F. Supp. 721 (W.D. Mich. 1982). The Barry court
maintained that the Gunther Court's "recognition of intentional discrimination may
well signal the outer limit of legal theories cognizable under Title VII." 539 F. Supp.
at 726 (emphasis added).
104. 620 F.2d 228 (10th Cir.), cert. denied, 449 U.S. 888 (1980).
105. 563 F.2d 353 (8th Cir. 1977).
106. Spaulding, 35 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. (BNA) at 231 (citing Christensen v.
Iowa, 563 F.2d 353 (8th Cir. 1977)).
107. 35 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. (BNA) at 233.
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ally fit into a disparate impact model.10 8  This model, it
stated, was created to deal with specftc employment prac-
tices.10 9 It held that disparate impact is not the "appropriate
vehicle from which to launch a wide ranging attack on the
cumulative effect of a company's employment practices." 1 0
An employer's reliance on the market rate is certainly
not as "specific" as practices found violative of Title VII
under the disparate impact theory.11  However, market rate
is still within the ambit of Title VII if this reliance, while
neutral on its face, has a discriminatory impact. Title VII's
prohibition of discriminatory employment practices was in-
tended to be broadly inclusive, proscribing "not only overt
discrimination, but also practices that are fair in form, but
discriminatory in operation."' 2 Title VII, and the purpose
behind it, should not be enforced only when it is effortless to
do so. To apply disparate impact to one employment prac-
tice and not another is to draw artificial and arbitrary lines
which the legislature did not intend to have drawn. Title
VII contains no language which indicates that noninten-
tional discrimination is lawful." 3 No other court has con-
strued Title VII in this way with regard to any other facet of
employment. 1 4 Courts must "avoid interpretations of Title
VII that deprive victims of discrimination of a remedy, with-
out clear congressional mandate."'" 5
Furthermore, for the court to accept a "disparate treat-
ment" argument and reject a "disparate impact" argument
for comparable worth plaintiffs creates an unjustifiable bur-
den. The line between intentional and nonintentional dis-
108. Id. at 231.
109. Id. The court said that the disparate impact model of proof was applicable
to such specific employment practices as an employer's intelligence tests which ad-
versely affect minorities, height and weight requirements affecting those of a certain
sex, or policies requiring commencement of leave upon pregnancy. Id at 231-32.
110. Id. at 232 (citation omitted).
111. See, e.g., Wright v. Olin Corp., 697 F.2d 1172 (4th Cir. 1982) (disparate
impact theory appropriate in challenge to program which excluded fertile women for
jobs involving possible exposure to harmful chemicals).
112. Griggs v. Duke Power Co., 401 U.S. 424, 431 (1971).
113. See42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e to 2000e-17 (1982).
114. See, e.g., Bellace, Comparable Worth: Proving Sex-Based Wage Discrimina-
tion, 69 IowA L. REv. 655, 671 (1984).
115. County of Washington v. Gunther, 452 U.S. 161, 178 (1981).
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crimination, already blurred, should be erased." 6 The side
of a line that comparable worth plaintiffs are on should not
determine whether they have an action for discrimination
under Title VII. The factual differences between the Spauld-
ing and AFSCME decisions dictate that the latter's holding
should not tremendously affect the AFSCME plaintiffs' case
on appeal. The Spaulding decision is replete with criticism
of the plaintiffs' statistical study. 1 7 No formal study of job
worth was pursued.1 8  Conversely, the job evaluation in
AFSCME was the basis for the plaintiff's argument.
Finally, courts should not consider the Spaulding deci-
sion as unequivocal and fully supported. True, the decision
was reached by a 3-0 vote. However, the author of the con-
curring opinion, while agreeing with the final decision, dis-
agreed with the majority's meshing of "adverse impact with
varying concepts of comparable worth.""19 That is, the dis-
trict court's final findings of fact and conclusions of law con-
tained nothing pertaining to the concept of comparable
worth. 120 The plaintiffs continually stressed that this case
was not based on the comparable worth theory.' 2' Hence,
"it [was] . . . not possible for [the] court. . . to render any
definitive ruling on the validity of comparable worth (and
116. A court's "assumption that in most cases intentional meddling with the
wage-setting process somehow can be distinguished sharply from nonintentional
meddling is based on a misunderstanding of job evaluation and compensation prac-
tices. Blatant discrimination of the Gunthervariety is the exception and not the rule."
Bellace, supra note 114, at 671.
117. Spaulding, 35 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. (BNA) at 234 (Schroeder, J.,
concurring).
118. See 35 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. (BNA) at 226-29. For instance, the nurses'
statistics never compared female nursing wages to wages of female faculty members
in other departments. If there is no such comparison, the court "[has] no meaningful
way of determining just how much of the proposed wage differential was due to sex
and how much was due to academic discipline." Id. at 229. The court said the
nurses' statistics were "rife with unreliability." Id. The "statistics were compiled by a
paralegal services company that did not use a regression model but only, apparently,
a simple matching technique." Id
119. Id at 234 (Schroeder, J., concurring).
120. See id
121. See id. Justice Schroeder pointed out that the reason the plaintiffs did not
articulate a comparable worth theory was because the case was filed long before
County of Washington v. Gunther, 452 U.S. 161 (1981).
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disparate impact), as a tool in employment discrimination
cases." 1
22
While the Spaulding decision may affect the AFSCME
plaintiff's strategy on appeal,123 the AFSCME case was
nonetheless an indisputable victory for comparable worth
plaintiffs. It will most likely be a catalyst for future compa-
rable worth suits throughout the country. The Ninth Circuit
Court of Appeals decision is expected sometime in 1985.124
However, regardless of how profound the AFSCME deci-
sion's impact might seem, other federal courts, including the
Ninth Circuit, may very well construe the decision to be
quite limited. Plaintiffs must take great care in articulating
their arguments. They must fit their claim within a possibly
narrowly construed holding of the case, or alternately, be
able to persuasively argue that the AFSCME holding em-
compasses a broader claim. Nonetheless, even the most nar-
row interpretation of the AFSCME holding cannot refute
that the court found that: (1) the State of Washington's own
job evaluation study revealed large disparities of pay for
jobs of comparable worth between predominantly female
and male classifications; (2) the State essentially ignored the
study and continued the same wage compensation rate; and
(3) in doing so, the State intentionally discriminated against
the plaintiffs.
III. ESTABLISHING A COMPARABLE WORTH CLAIM
Plaintiffs have an abundance of ammunition, yet must be
cautious in bringing a comparable worth action. Due to its
122. 35 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. (BNA) at 229.
123. The AFSCME respondents will no longer be able to rely on the "disparate
impact" theory. This should not pose any significant problems for them as the district
court found a violation of Title VII by both the disparate impact and disparate treat-
ment theories. See AFSCME, 578 F. Supp. at 864-65.
124. Telephone interview with Lisa Newell, AFSCME plaintiffs' attorney (July
24, 1984). It is interesting to note that the Washington Court of Appeals previously
rejected a comparable worth claim. In Tacoma-Pierce v. Tacoma-Pierce County
Health Dep't, 22 Wash. App. 1, 586 P.2d 1215 (1978), the court denied the plaintiffs-
nurses' claims that their work had traditionally been undervalued when compared to
male public health sanitarium workers. Id. at _, 586 P.2d at 1218. The court held
that it would "ignore economic reality to pay employees of different sexes the same




controversial nature, 125 novelty, and revolutionary impact, 126
courts will no doubt be very prudent, if not skeptical, in
scrutinizing comparable worth claims. Of the different types
of comparable worth theories proposed, courts will most
likely consider those similar to that in AFSCME v. State of
Washington.127 That is, allegations of sex-based wage dis-
crimination which are supported by evidence such as a job
evaluation have the best chance of being accepted by the
courts. Comparable worth actions which lack any type of
concrete evidence will likely be rejected by the courts as in-
sufficient in setting forth a prima facie case of discrimina-
tion.1 28  The following discussion sets forth two types of
comparable worth arguments plaintiffs can bring, the vari-
ous methods of advancing them, the approaches they can an-
ticipate from employers, and arguments to refute those
approaches.
A. Pure Comparable Worth
The most controversial theory of comparable worth has
been labeled "pure comparable worth."'129 A proponent of
this theory postulates that whenever there is job segregation
by sex, wage discrimination is virtually inevitable. 30  She
has contended that "[w]henever there is job segregation, the
same forces which determine that certain jobs or job catego-
ries will be reserved for women or minorities, also and si-
multaneously determine that the economic value of those
jobs is less than if they were. .. 'male jobs.' ,,131 The author
cited to a plethora of economic, historical, and social studies
125. The theory's controversial nature stems from its conflict with wage determi-
nation policy. It does not account for influences of the internal job markets, labor
unions, the segmentation of the labor market, and employer and employee prefer-
ences for job stability. See Note, supra note 4, at 1099 n.84.
126. Comparable worth could drastically reduce the wage gap. If the wage gap
were bridged in one year, it would cost $320 billion and raise inflation by ten points.
The Christian Science Monitor, Jan. 19, 1984, at 17, col. 2.
127. 578 F. Supp. 846 (W.D. Wash. 1983).
128. See infra text accompanying notes 136-37.
129. The adjective "pure" is used because, although the plaintiff alleges'that there
is undercompensation relative to a job's value, there has been no attempt to compare
the "undervalued" job with the higher paying positions. See Comment, Comparable
Worth Theory, supra note 2, at 502 n.37.




to fortify her argument.132 She observed that women have,
for so long, been segregated from men in the work force.133
Since male-occupied positions have historically been higher
paying, the segregated work force perpetuates women's inac-
cessibility to higher wages. Indeed, the studies lend much
convincing support to her thesis. 134
According to this pure comparable worth theory, plain-
tiffs need not show disparate treatment or impact to establish
a "prima facie" case of wage discrimination. To establish a
prima facie case, they need only prove that their jobs are
predominantly filled by women and that their wages are on
the lower end of the wage scale. 35
In light of the fact that the district court in Spaulding v.
University of Washington1 36 disallowed a "disparate impact"
argument in a comparable worth claim, employees would be
foolhardy to rely on a pure comparable worth theory. With
the courts so anxious about any comparable worth claim,
they will most likely demand more than an allegation of
wage discrimination based solely on the pure prima facie el-
ements. If this theory were accepted by the courts, an em-
ployer could be liable for wage discrimination without any
evidence of discrimination against employees. Though the
law is continually in flux, many courts may feel that the
AFSCME v. State of Washington 37 decision has moved far
enough in granting relief to plaintiffs who have established a
prima facie comparable worth case of discrimination via dis-
parate impact or treatment. Plaintiffs would be wise to pres-
ent a much more solid case than that required in a "pure
comparable worth" claim. This advice, however, is not
meant to disparage the pure comparable worth argument.
But as statistically sound as the argument may be, courts do
132. Id at 402-57.
133. Id. at 402. The author maintained that there was literature from as far back
as 1910 which disclosed the stability of patterns of sex discrimination. Id at 403 n.10.
134. The main theme of the article is that wage discrimination is the direct result
of job discrimination. See id at 401. Many of the job markets women enter are
traditionally segregated and lower-paying. They are lower paying, in part at least,
because they are jobs reserved for women. Id at 456.
135. Id. at 459.
136. 35 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. (BNA) 217 (9th Cir. 1984).
137. 578 F. Supp. 846 (W.D. Wash. 1983).
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not seem willing to accept such a drastic and loose standard
for establishing a prima facie case of wage discrimination.
B. Job Evaluation
1. Employer's Job Evaluation
Undoubtedly, the majority of litigation over comparable
worth will stem from results of job evaluation studies. 138
States which take the initiative to innocuously implement a
wage compensation study effectively assent to pay women
their comparable worth. That is, unless the factors used
within the job evaluation are carbon-copies of the discrimi-
natory marketplace, 139 it is difficult to imagine a study which
would not reflect that women are consistently being paid less
than men for comparable work. Following its affirmative
action in ordering the study, a state will again have to af-
firmatively act in increasing women's wages. For, having
been the impetus for the study, the state could not be heard
to simply say that the results are incorrect. The AFSCME
case illustrates this situation. The entire AFSCME opinion
is void of a single mention of the study's validity. By neither
addressing nor questioning the study's validity, the court and
defendant implicitly acquiesced in its results. If the state, as
in the AFSCME case, fails to appropriate funds to amelio-
rate the discriminatory wage rate, it must be prepared to de-
fend itself in a "failure to pay" suit. In such a suit, the
defendant would still have the right to try and overcome the
presumption of the study's accuracy. 140 If successful, the de-
fendant would then have to offer evidence of the difference
in job values in order to rebut the charge of wage
discrimination.' 4'
138. For information about job evaluations, see Blumrosen I, supra note 2, at
429-57; and Gasaway, supra note 2, at 1155-60.
139. The marketplace discriminates against women because, after all the factors
that influence wage rate are taken into account, there still exists an inexplicable wage
gap. See supra notes 9-12 and accompanying text.




2. Plaintiffs Job Evaluation
In situations where the state has not undertaken a wage
evaluation study, plaintiffs have several options. Plaintiffs,
whether unionized or not, may be able to hire a reputable
independent firm, although this may entail substantial cost.
If the firm undertakes a study which reveals a wage disparity
for comparable work, the plaintiffs could use this to establish
their disparate impact claim. Should the state wish to con-
test the validity of the study's results, it must prove by clear
and convincing evidence that the study's results are com-
pletely erroneous.142 In order to do so, the state may have no
other recourse than to hire a firm to make its own study.
Typically, however, the studies' results would not substan-
tially deviate from each other. Years of studies have consist-
ently revealed that women receive less compensation than
men for comparable work.143 Nonetheless, if there were a
drastic difference between the two studies, a "battle of the
experts" would ensue, and it would be left to the trier of fact
to determine which study is more accurate. 144
3. Fact of Employer Not Implementing A Job Evaluation
Another opportunity plaintiffs have if the state refuses to
implement a job evaluation study is to use that very fact as
evidence of discrimination in their action. In the 1981 dis-
trict court case of Taylor v Charles Bros. 45 plaintiffs sued
their employer for purposeful sex discrimination in violation
of Title VII. In holding for the employees, the court stated
that the "[d]efendant Charles Brothers' intention to discrimi-
nate against women in setting their wage rates lower than
men may be inferred from the fact that it had not under-
taken any evaluation which would have indicated the value
142. If job evaluations are an accepted tool in comparable worth claims, defend-
ants cannot argue that the evaluation is "erroneous" because it does not incorporate
the marketplace influence. See infra notes 156-66 and accompanying text.
143. See, e.g., The Milwaukee J., Dec. 25, 1983, at 2, col. 2. The State of Wiscon-
sin is now conducting a sophisticated job evaluation study. The article maintains that
"[i]f our state is typical of virtually every other employer that has undergone such a
study, discrepancies will be found." Id.
144. Telephone interview with Lisa Newell, AFSCME plaintiffs' attorney (Feb.
9, 1984).
145. 25 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. (BNA) 602 (W.D. Pa. 1981).
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of the jobs held by either men or women .... While
admittedly the defendant partook in other actions violative
of Title VII, 147 the court seemed to interpret its failure to
implement an evaluation as an admission of those discrimi-
natory practices.148 In a disparate treatment case, where in-
tent is a necessary element, this type of argument may very
well persuade the judge that the plaintiff has established a
prima facie case.' 49 With a disparate impact claim this "in-
ferred intent" to discriminate, though not a requisite ele-
ment, would indeed bolster a plaintiffs action.' 0
These three preceding tactics - employing the state's
own evaluation plan, employing one's own evaluation and
possibly forcing the state to implement a wage discrimina-
tion study, or highlighting the state's failure to implement a
study - should effectively aid a plaintiff in a comparable
worth claim.' 5' Because job evaluations are critical to a
plaintiff's comparable worth claim, one of these three op-
tions is imperative for success.
IV. JOB EVALUATIONS
As noted earlier, credible job evaluations will most likely
produce results favorable to the employees.' 52 Defendants
cannot complacently sit back and hope that plaintiffs will
not employ one of these three tactics. The inevitable argu-
ment with which defendants will respond is that no job eval-
uation can measure the true worth of any given
occupation.' 53 They will maintain that a job's worth is influ-
enced by many factors such as supply and demand, collec-
146. Id at 614.
147. See id.
148. See id.
149. Cf. Texas Dep't of Community Affairs v. Burdine, 450 U.S. 248 (1981)
(holding that to establish a prima facie case of discrimination under the disparate
treatment theory, plaintiffs need only show facts which support an inference of intent
to discriminate).
150. See supra notes 84-88 and accompanying text.
151. But see B. SCHLEI & P. GROSSMAN, EMPLOYMENT DISCRIMINATION LAW
477-78 (1983) (establishing that another possible means of setting forth a comparable
worth claim is through regression analysis or an expert witness).
152. See supra notes 138-39 and accompanying text.
153. See Nelson, supra note 2, at 255-260.
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tive bargaining, market forces, and economic conditions. 154
More than one critic of comparable worth has expressed the
contention that "wage discrimination remains an amorphous
theory and an unmeasurable concept . . . [and] experts
agree that the necessary analytical methodology does not ex-
ist today."'' 55 Employers will challenge the validity of the
evaluations in an attempt to discount their impact.156 How-
ever, plaintiffs should not be deterred by these tactics and
would do well to utilize one or more of the following argu-
ments to support a comparable worth claim.
A. Established Use of Job Evaluations
The most persuasive and indisputable fact plaintiffs can
rely on is that employers routinely use job evaluations as a
tool to set wages in accordance with their relative worth. 157
In Corning Glass Works v. Brennan 58 the United States
Supreme Court observed that "most of American industry
use formal, systematic job evaluation plans to establish equi-
table wage structures in their plants."1 59 Significantly, the
Court incorporated a Coming representative's testimony at a
Senate hearing in its opinion. The representative stated that
"U]ob evaluation is an accepted and tested method of attain-
ing equity in wage relationship. . . .We sincerely hope that
this committee. . . will recognize in its language the general
role of job evaluation in establishing equitable rate
relationship."' 160
Job evaluations are used widely in both public and pri-
vate sectors.'6' Though job evaluations vary from one an-
154. See Milkovich, The Male-Female Pay Gap: The Needfor Reevaluation,
MONTHLY LAB. REV., Apr. 1981, at 43.
155. Nelson, supra note 2, at 288.
156. See generally Note, supra note 4, at 1098 n.77 (listing articles which posit
that there is no objective standard by which a defendant can determine the relative
worth of jobs).
157. See Note, supra note 12, at 674. For a description of some of these systems,
see Blumrosen I, supra note 2, at 430 n.133.
158. 417 U.S. 188 (1974).
159. Id. at 199.
160. Id. at 200.
161. D. TREIMAN, JOB EVALUATION: AN ANALYTIC REVIEW 49 n.1 (1979). The
majority of large private firms, the federal government, and most state and large
county governments use formal job evaluation procedures.
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other, they all share the same methodology.16 2  That is,
remuneration is based on the content of the job, not the
characteristics of its holder.1 63 Basically, jobs are described
via questionnaires, observations, or interviews with employ-
ees. Each job is then broken down with respect to its charac-
teristics of difficulty, responsibility, working conditions,
duties, and any other important factors. 64 Jobs are then
ranked according to their value to the organization. Once
completed, the job plan aids in setting wages for the organi-
zation. 65 In its method of setting wage rates for the organi-
zation, the industry-accepted job evaluation does, in fact,
compare dissimilar work. In light of this comparison, the
common contention that any implementation of a compara-
ble worth theory will be "highly subjective and indetermi-
nate" 166 has little weight.
B. Market Rate Should Not Be Considered
Critics of comparable worth contend that while wages
are determined by job-related factors, other influences such
as societal values, labor-management relations, and market
rate influence them as well.' 67 This fact cannot be denied.
However, these outside influences, particularly societal val-
ues and market rate, are in many ways the root of the prob-
lem. 68  Societal values perpetuate the major source of
discrimination. That is, women's jobs are valued less be-
cause they are "women's work" and not because of any pro-
ductivity-related attributes of the work performed. 6 9 This
162. See Comment, Comparable Worth Theory, supra note 2, at 510.
163. D. BELCHER, COMPENSATION ADMINISTRATION 88 (1974).
164. See Comment, Comparable Worth Theory, supra note 2, at 510. Frequently,
the factors used in job evaluations mirror the "equal skill, effort, and responsibility"
language of the Equal Pay Act. See supra note 33 for the text of the Act. Some
factors used in job evaluations are the amount of "skill, responsibility, and physical
and mental effort requisite to job performance, and the quality of the work environ-
ment." See Note, supra note 12, at 676 (citation omitted).
165. See Comment, Comparable Worth Theory, supra note 2, at 510.
166. See Note, supra note 4, at 1098.
167. Id.
168. See Blumrosen I, supra note 2, at 402-28 (observing that if society perceives
women's economic value as less than that of men, women are paid less than men).
169. See Milkovich, supra note 154, at 42. The author asserted that the proper
question is not "what causes women to be employed in lower paying jobs," but rather,
"what causes female jobs to be paid less than male jobs?" Id at 43.
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depressed wage rate for women in turn becomes the market
rate to which other employers look in establishing their
wages for women. It is a vicious cycle in which the cause of
what comparable worth advocates are trying to remedy hap-
pens to be the same factors which opponents state are essen-
tial in wage setting. No job evaluation is free from
subjectivity. However, the alternative of ignoring the tre-
mendous hardships inflicted on women because of wage dis-
parity would disregard the very purpose of Title VII. 170
Because sophisticated job evaluations have been developed
and utilized throughout the years to aid employers in setting
wages, employers have no ground to now assert that there is
no yardstick to measure a job's worth.
Even if employers accept the use of a job evaluation
study, as stated earlier, most will adamantly contend that the
market rate is an influential factor that must be consid-
ered.17 1 This argument is not without support. The Tenth
Circuit Court of Appeals in Lemons v. City of Denver 172 fo-
cused on the market rate in denying the plaintiffs relief. The
plaintiffs, city nurses, argued that their wage rate should not
be compared to the community wage rate for nurses as the
community rate was the product of historical underpayment
for nurses. The court relied on the Eighth Circuit's Christen-
sen v. State of Iowa 173 decision in holding that "'[w]e do not
interpret Title VII as requiring an employer to ignore the
market in setting wage rates for genuinely different work
classifications.' "'174
170. See Franks v. Bowman Transp. Co., 424 U.S. 747 (1976), in which the
Supreme Court emphasized:
[11n enacting Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, Congress intended to
prohibit all practices in whatever form which create inequality in employment
opportunity due to discrimination on the basis of. . .sex. . . and ordained
that its policy of outlawing such discrimination should have the "highest
priority."
Id at 763 (citations omitted).
171. See supra note 167 and accompanying text.
172. 620 F.2d 228 (10th Cir.), cert. denied, 449 U.S. 888 (1980).
173. 563 F.2d 353 (8th Cir. 1977).
174. Id at 232 (quoting Christensen v. State of Iowa, 563 F.2d 353 (8th Cir.
1977)). The Christensen plaintiffs were clerical workers who alleged undercompensa-
tion as compared to the physical plant workers. The court said that defendants' deter-
mination by "community wage rate" was a legitimate justification for the differential.
Christensen, 563 F.2d at 362. See also Spaulding v. University of Washington, 35 Fair
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With no subsequent Supreme Court case explicitly ruling
otherwise, the holdings of County of Washington v. Gun-
ther 7 5 and AFSCME v. State of Washington176 shed new
light on the subject. Both cases uphold the validity of the
job evaluation studies. If a female employee is paid the mar-
ket rate for her job and a job evaluation study reveals that
she is paid significantly less than a male holding a compara-
ble job, the market rate should not be a defense. For the
court to allow such a defense would acknowledge the mar-
ketplace's inherent discrimination, yet sanction its use as a
means to continue discrimination. The former cases' hold-
ings might have been different had the plaintiffs relied on
job evaluations to support their claims.
Nonetheless, employers might assert that despite the
Gunther and AFSCME rulings, the fourth affirmative de-
fense of the Equal Pay Act 177 allows the market rate to be an
influence. They would argue that this "factor other than
sex" defense permits them to take the market rate into con-
sideration. The argument would posit that the market rate
defense is a "factor other than sex" which allows for a pay
differential in a Title VII gender-based wage discrimination
action. Hence, the market rate is acceptable, if not neces-
sary, as an aid in setting wages. But this argument fails to
appreciate that, in an equal pay action, courts have held that
employers may not assert that wages were paid in accord-
ance with the prevailing market wage. 178 Thus, while "mar-
ket rate" is a "factor other than sex," it is not a valid defense
Empl. Prac. Cas. (BNA) 217, 232 (9th Cir. 1984) ("[e]very employer constrained by
market forces must consider market value in setting his [or her] labor costs.").
175. 452 U.S. 161 (1981).
176. 578 F. Supp. 846 (W.D. Wash. 1983).
177. 29 U.S.C. § 206(d)(1) (1982).
178. See, e.g., Coming Glass Works v. Brennan, 417 U.S. 188, 204-05 (1974)
(commenting that the differential in men's and women's wages arose because men
would not work at the low rates paid to the women and reflected a job market in
which Coming would pay women less than it paid men for the same job; this dispar-
ity obviously became illegal with the advent of the Equal Pay Act). Cf. Brennan v.
Price William Hosp. Corp., 503 F.2d 282 (4th Cir. 1974), cert. denied 420 U.S. 972
(1975) (fact that women were available at a lower wage rate than men was not a
defense under the Equal Pay Act); Homer v. Mary Institute, 613 F.2d 706 (8th Cir.
1980) (general belief that women will work for less does not justify disparity although




in an equal pay action. There appears to be no legitimate
reason why this ruling should not also apply to a comparable
worth action. If Title VII has as its broad remedial purpose
the prevention of discriminatory compensation, a defend-
ant's reliance on discriminatory market rates should not be
accepted as a defense.
Those who maintain that "market rate" must be incorpo-
rated apparently do so in the belief that supply and demand
are the ultimate determinants of what job should be ac-
corded what wage. 17 9 If there is a shortage of jobs, employ-
ers will naturally pay more to attract workers; conversely,
crowded job markets cause a reduced wage. Put simply, an
employer should pay what an employee will accept. If this is
the case, how does the "invisible hand" of the marketplace
explain the depressed state of nurses' salaries, despite an es-
timated 65,000 to 70,000 nationwide shortage of nurses? 80
The marketplace is not an impersonal absolute but an
aggregate of attitudes and beliefs of employers. When en-
acting Title VII, Congress meant to alter the market by re-
quiring employers to alter their behavior. 8 The market
wage is laden with discriminatory biases and will only en-
force and perpetuate the huge disparities between the com-
pensation for men and women. Finally, while opponents of
comparable worth argue that Title VII was not meant to in-
tervene in the marketplace, a more accurate assessment is
that it was intended to interfere with it. If there was no dis-
crimination in the marketplace, there would be no need for
Title VII. To reach its main objective of equal employment
practices, Title VII has frequently interfered with supply and
demand. Recruitment, promotion, seniority systems, and
fringe benefits are but a few practices which Title VII af-
fects. 182 By affecting these, supply and demand of the mar-
ketplace is naturally also affected. To alter a discriminatory
practice in the marketplace, it follows that one must alter the
marketplace itself.
179. See Nelson, supra note 2, at 254-63.
180. The Christian Science Monitor, Jan. 19, 1984, at 17, col. 2.
181. See Comment, Equal Payfor Comparable Work, supra note 2, at 500.
182. See Blumrosen I, supra note 2, at 471-72; Blumrosen II, supra note 2, at 1, 5.
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C. Job Evaluation -s Subjectivity
Underestimates Discrimation
While job evaluations can and should be implemented,
they too are not free from undervaluation of "women's
work." If anything, they underestimate the amount of dis-
crimination towards women.8 3 At almost every stage of the
internal evaluation process, subjective and biased views as to
the nature of the job and its importance may come into
play. 18 4 Subjective judgments can severely influence four ar-
eas of the evaluation process: job analysis, job description,
selection of compensable factors, and the act of weighing
these factors.8 5
An explanation for some of this subjective judgment is
the fact that job evaluations originated out of industrial set-
tings where most of the workers were men. Accordingly,
many points were given for tasks inherent within the indus-
trial setting. 18 6 Thus, evaluations accorded high priority to
jobs involving heavy lifting or working in cramped or awk-
ward quarters. 87 When tasks affiliated with jobs tradition-
ally held by women were evaluated, they were not perceived
to be as "valuable" as those tasks done by men. 88 Hence,
skills such as manual dexterity and demands such as fatigue
or repetition - characteristics of women-dominated clerical
jobs - were not accorded a high point value.18 9 Further-
more, male evaluators are likely to better appreciate the dif-
ficulties associated with traditionally male jobs than those
183. For a discussion of the problems inherent in job evaluations, see A. GOLD,
supra note I, at 51-77. See also Blumrosen I, supra note 2, at 428-57 (despite objective
criteria, women's work is ultimately undervalued in job evaluations).
184. See Blumrosen I, supra note 2, at 434.
185. Id. at 434-35.
186. Telephone interview with Lisa Newell, AFSCME plaintiffs' attorney (July
24, 1984).
187. Id.
188. An illuminating example of this phenomenon is found in Thompson v.
Boyle, 499 F. Supp. 1147 (D.D.C. 1979), mod#Fea 678 F.2d 257 (1982). Female book
bindery workers sued the Government Printing Office and claimed their work was
equal to that of the male bookbinders. The defendants used their job evaluation to
defend their practice of paying women lower wages. The job evaluation asserted that
women were given no points for hand sewing experience because the sewing was of
the variety most women knew how to perform. Id. at 1155.
189. See Blumrosen I, supra note 2, at 435.
1984]
MARQ UETTE LAW REVIEW
associated with women's jobs.90 To some extent "one of the
unstated goals of job evaluation may be to confer legitimacy
on the status quo, which, at least in part, is a product of sex
discrimination."19'
Therefore, though the job evaluation strives for objectiv-
ity, it is still afflicted with inherent subjectivity and bias.192
Nonetheless, as this subjectivity clearly works against wo-
men, courts should not prohibit the job evaluation's use in a
wage discrimination action. 93 Overall, job evaluations give
a fairly good appraisal of a job's true worth. This conclusion
is, in part, based on the fact that there are states other than
Washington that have set up job evaluation systems based
on the comparable worth theory. Idaho has successfully im-
plemented the Hay System, 94 which compares jobs with
respect to "know-how," problem-solving, and accountabil-
ity. 95 That these states have willingly developed these eval-
uations lends credence to the position that they can be
effectively utilized. Comparable jobs should be equally
compensated, and thus far, the job evaluation is the best
method of ascertaining what jobs are comparable. 96
V. COST OF COMPARABLE WORTH
Another "practical consideration" which militates
against the comparable worth concept is the economic bur-
190. Id. at 437.
191. Comment, Equal Pay, supra note 2, at 498.
192. See Blumrosen I, supra note 2, at 428-45.
193. See Comment, Equal Pay, supra note 2, at 496-99. See also Comment, Com-
parable Worth Theory, supra note 2, at 512 ("[i]n spite of the uncertainty that sur-
rounds the use of [employer personnel information and job evaluations], future Title
VII litigation will rely increasingly on them as evidence of sex-based wage
discrimination.").
194. See IDAHO CODE § 67-5309(B) (1980) (determining relative worth of each
job classification).
195. See Gasaway, supra note 2, at 1159 n.378 (this type of job evaluation is used
extensively to evaluate professional and higher managerial jobs).
196. Both private corporations and states can devise a job evaluation system
based upon comparable worth. This ability fortifies the Court's response to the
County's argument in County of Washington v. Gunther, 452 U.S. 161 (1981), that if
comparable worth claims were entertained by the Court, it would place "the pay
structure of virtually every employer and the entire economy. . . at risk and subject
to scrutiny by the federal courts." Id at 180. The Court stated that the respondents
relied on the county's evaluation and thus, the suit "does not require a court to make
its own subjective assessment. ... Id at 181.
[Vol. 68:93
COMPA4RABLE WORTH
den it will place on employers. 97 The cost of implementing
a comparable worth system and increasing women's wages
would be tremendous. 198 Employers complain that in addi-
tion to the tremendous cost of increasing women's wages,
there is also the cost of designing and implementing a job
evaluation study199 and the possibility of court-ordered
backpay °200
While the significant expense cannot be denied, neither
can society deny the existence and perpetuation of sex-based
wage discrimination. The court in AFSCME v. State of
Washington2°' quickly discarded the state's contention that
the economic burden would be prohibitive. The court main-
tained that the cost of correcting sex-based wage discrimina-
tion was not a defense to an award of back pay and
injunctive relief.202 The court went on to note that Title VII
does not contain a cost-justification defense. "Charges of
opponents [of comparable worth] that adoption of the con-
cept would be 'economical disaster' are the same arguments
that were used against child labor laws." 203 Similarly, the
court in Brown v. Board of Education2 4 refused to accept the
defendant's cost-justification argument.0 5 If the court had,
"separate but equal" might still be the accepted rule in edu-
cation today.
197. See Nelson, supra note 2, at 290-94.
198. See, e.g., The Christian Science Monitor, Jan. 19, 1984, at 17, col. 3. A
court-appointed master in AFSCME . State of Washington, 578 F. Supp. 846 (W.D.
Wash. 1983), is structuring a new salary plan for state employees. The settlement,
which includes back pay, should reach nearly one billion dollars. The Christian Sci-
ence Monitor, Jan. 19, 1984, at 17, col. 3.
199. See Nelson, supra note 2, at 290-91.
200. See, e.g., AFSCME v. State of Washington, 578 F. Supp. 846, 869 (1983)
(focusing on "make whole" philosophy of Title VII which mandated backpay to
plaintiffs).
201. 578 F. Supp. 846 (W.D. Wash. 1983).
202. Id at 867-68. The court stated that "where a legal injury is of an economic
character '[t]he general rule is, that when a wrong has been done, and the law gives a
remedy, the compensation shall be equal to the injury."' Id at 869 (quoting Wicker
v. Hoppock, 73 U.S. (6 Wall) 94, 99 (1867)).
203. Pay Equity and Comparable Worth, supra note 19, at 70 (paraphrasing Janice
Blood, publicist for District 925, National Assocation of Working Women).
204. 464 F.2d 382 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 409 U.S. 981 (1972).
205. Id at 384. To accept the Board's argument that it "lacks 'the facilities, the
buses, personnel or the know how to bus' is of no avail ...[and] would render the
entire plan of desegregation a futile gesture." Id
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Furthermore, the Civil Rights Act simply contains no
language that would justify denying relief on the basis of
cost. The United States Supreme Court in County of Wash-
ington v. Gunther2 6 noted that federal courts "must avoid
interpretations of Title VII that deprive victims of discrimi-
nation of a remedy, without clear congressional mandate." 207
Understandably, cost is a major factor in a comparable
worth suit; however, the language of Title VII does not pro-
vide for balancing this cost against the harm inflicted.
The effects of comparable worth suits need not be as
drastic as employers contend they will be.20 8 The AFSCME
court rejected an "all deliberate speed" approach and man-
dated an immediate injunction.20 9 The primary reason for
this stringent order was quite likely the fact that the State of
Washington intentionally continued to discriminate against
the plaintiffs after the job evaluations were known. Other
courts might allow for a gradual implementation of new
wage rates, thus permitting employers time to adjust to the
increased costs.
Another method of implementing the comparable worth
theory is through unionized collective bargaining.2t 0 As the
percentage and strength of women in labor unions increases,
collective bargaining becomes a viable option for them. A
classic example of collective bargaining's success in a com-
206. 452 U.S. 161 (1981).
207. Id. at 178. See also City of Los Angeles v. Manhart, 435 U.S. 702, 716-17
(1978), in which the Court stated that Title VII does not contain "a cost justification
defense comparable to the affirmative defense available in a price discrimination
suit."
208. In 1982, the Minnesota legislature implemented legislation requiring Minne-
sota to pay state employees comparable wages for comparable work. Commissioner
Nina Rothchild of the Legislative Commission on Employee Relations said that the
comparable worth program ran very smoothly. Payment Equity and Comparable
Worth, supra note 19, at 59. Furthermore, Hewitt Associates, in a survey to 537 of its
members, asked if the company's salary administration program could effectively deal
with the concept of comparable worth. Sixty-three percent of the respondents replied
that it could. Id. at 7.
209. AFSCME, 578 F. Supp. at 868.
210. See Gasaway, supra note 2, at 1166-67. It should be noted than many un-
ions support the comparable worth theory. These include the AFL-CIO, AFSCME,
United Food and Commercial Workers, United Electrical, Radio, and Machine
Workers, National Education Association, Service Employees International Union,
and Communication Workers of America. Pay Equity and Comparable Worth, supra
note 19, at 4.
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parable worth situation occurred a few years ago. A study
by an independent consultant revealed that the City of San
Jose, California paid women fifteen percent less than it paid
men for comparable work.211 After a strike by the AFSCME
employees, a settlement provided that 1.45 million dollars
would be allocated over the next two years to raise the wo-
mens wages. 2' 2
Many state legislatures are enacting statutes which man-
date equal pay for comparable worth.213 Other states are not
far behind and are passing laws requiring a study of pay in-
equity between women and men performing comparable
work.214 That these state legislatures are taking affirmative
steps to address comparable worth is a clear signal that it is a
formidable issue of increasing importance. Significantly, ex-
pense has not deterred these states from implementing or
considering the implementation of a system in which compa-
rable worth is operative.
Finally, states are now on notice and should anticipate
potential comparable wage suits. Accordingly, they may
want to avoid the threat of litigation and take initiative
themselves. By conducting their own job evaluation studies
they can, based on the study's results, allocate money to re-
solve the comparable worth problem. In 1973, the State of
Minnesota implemented its own job evaluation study. Its re-
sults were the impetus for an appropriation of 21.7 million
211. See A. GOLD, supra note I, at 88.
212. Id AFSCME's collective bargaining "has been successful in negotiating
pay equity raises for its members in Minnesota; San Jose, California; New York State;
New York City; Green Bay, Wisconsin; City of Los Angeles; San Mateo County,
California; Belmont, California; San Carlos, California; Illinois; Portland, Oregon;
and Spokane, Washington. Pay Equity and Comparable Worth, supra note 19, at 74.
213. At present, fourteen states have "comparable worth" laws that prohibit pay-
ing a woman a salary or wage rate which is less than that paid to a male when both
are doing "comparable work" or performing work of "comparable character." Pay
Equity and Comparable Worth, supra note 19, at 55. Still, many other states have
considered or are now considering incorporating the concept of comparable worth
into their wage-setting policies for public employees. Id. at 61-68.
214. See id. at 55-68 for an excellent examination of states currently undertaking
studies on pay disparities between men and women doing comparable work and








The undervaluation of women's jobs continues to be a
severe economic and social problem. As long as the true
worth of women's jobs is not recognized, women will carry
with them an unjust and undeserved economic burden. It is
time to fully embrace Justice Steven's remark that " '[in for-
bidding employers to discriminate against individuals be-
cause of their sex, Congress intended to strike at the entire
spectrum of disparate treatment of men and women resulting
from sex stereotypes.' ",216 To strike at this "entire spec-
trum," courts, and society as a whole, must attack the major
source of wage discrimination which is currently not prohib-
ited by case or statutory law. This phenomenon, allowing
unequal pay for comparable worth, drastically affects wo-
men because of the high rate of sex-segregation in the work-
place. The concept of comparable worth is a valuable and
workable weapon. With the advent of AFSCME v. State of
Washington 217 comparable worth plaintiffs have support and
hope for victory. The decision exemplified the utility of a
job evaluation in establishing a prima facie case of disparate
treatment or impact. With the aid of job evaluations, a tool
used throughout American industry, employees will be
equipped with sufficient evidence to set forth a prima facie
case of discrimination.
Plaintiffs should expect to be confronted with the argu-
ment that job evaluations do not reflect the necessary influ-
ence of market rate. But if the market rate itself is
discriminatory, Title VII militates against its incorporation
in job evaluations, as well as its use as a defense. Though
215. SeeThe Milwaukee J., Dec. 25, 1983, at 2, col. 1. The State of Minnesota set
aside one and one-half percent of its payroll for the new budget. It should take five
years to completely eliminate the sex bias against women. Id at col. 3.
216. Los Angeles Dep't of Water & Power v. Manhart, 435 U.S. 702, 707 n.13
(1978) (emphasis added) (quoting Sprogis v. United Airlines, Inc., 444 F.2d 1194,
1198 (7th Cir. 1971)).
217. 578 F. Supp. 846 (W.D. Wash. 1983).
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the remedy may be costly, expense should not be a bar to
those seeking justice.
ELLEN M. RYAN
